中国造船厂生存之道
2012.07.16
一：本期头条
6月份之 Marine Log 月刊和贸易凤 07月06日周刊 登有三篇由国内专业人士 Mr.Sean Wang 和 Mr.Li sheng 所撰写对中国造船厂之评价和建议. 原文如下:
Broker tips survival of China yards 李先生对一些投资充足和责任严肃的造船厂还是表示乐观. 认为可以渡过日前难关. 对外界传说之大批中国造船厂即将关闭之论认为是过于誇张.( 图 1).
在高峰所立之400家 “新兴造船厂” 以他们资金来源和与船公司之关系大约可分成三大类……..
A broker’s largely optimistc interpretation lies with yards that have a commitment to the industry and whose investment was serious and adequate.
Predictions of a mass extinction of Chinese shipyards are greatly exaggerated, says one prominent broker. Most yards that disappear will be the ones that never made very large capital investments in the first place.
Li Sheng, the head of Shanghai-based sale-and-purchase (S&P) and newbuilding broker Mainland Shipping, has made a study of the approximately 400 builders that he categorises as “emerging Chinese shipyards” (ECSs) and believes that all but a fraction will “survive the winter”.
Li’s data was originally generated for an ECS guidebook that he intended to write. He gave up the book project because of the speed with which the subject matter was changing but in a recent interview at his Shanghai office and subsequent conversations with TradeWinds, he shared research, photographs and his largely optimistic interpretations.
Despite the dearth of new orders, an epidemic of cancellations — both justified and unjustified — and the headline-making collapse of some shipbuilders, Li believes the strongest of his country’s emerging yards have already adapted successfully to the present harsh environment.
Li, who defines an ECS as a yard that did not exist before 2005, thinks the main criteria for whether the yards have what it takes to pull through the challenging times will be their commitment to the industry and the degree to which their original investment was serious and adequate.
“Shipyards with a strong financial background dedicated to the shipping business are doing quite well,” he said.
The yards that date to the boom years of Chinese shipbuilding are about 400 and they can be divided into three categories based on their sources of capital and the degree of their connection to the shipping industry:
Shipbuilders that developed from an industrial concern or trading house with a cargo book of its own.
Shipbuilders that were developed by shipowners in part to serve their own tonnage needs.
Shipbuilders that were set up speculatively to invest profits earned in totally non-shipping related industries such as textiles, real estate or electronics.
In Group 1 belong yards such as Yangzhou Guoyu, which is backed by a Wuhan-area steel supplier, the Guoyu Logistics Group; the cash-rich Sainty Shipyard in Nanjing, which was set up by state-owned Guangdong Machinery Group (GMG); Zhejiang Zengzhou Shipyard, owned by one of China’s largest manufacturers of steel pipe; and the group of shipyards controlled by state-owned importer Avic, including Avic Weihai, Avic Diheng and Catic Taizhou.
Group 2 includes such emerging yards as Zhejiang Zhenghe, connected to the shipping company of the same name in Qingdao, and the Xinle yard at Ningbo in Zhejiang province, one of whose principals was a shipowner before setting up the yard. Its collapsed Ningbo neighbour, Blue Sky or Lantian Shipbuilding, also belongs in the category of shipowner-controlled shipyards.
Group 3 includes, for example, the Qifan yard in Zhejiang province, which was set up with money earned by a supermarket chain, and Wujia Zui in Nanjing, started by a property developer.
Although Li’s analysis is fine-grained in respect of particular yards and based largely on detailed first-hand investigation, there are broad trends that stand out.
He sees the yards likeliest to survive as those who have made substantial investments in infrastructure and equipment and who are now building ships for their own account. Of the yards mentioned above, Sainty, Zhenghe, Zhengzhou and Guoyu are all building for themselves and all have either cargo books or technical and commercial experience of their own.
Some other niche yards are taking a different approach of slowing down the building process and trying to wait out the market, watching costs and trying to maintain their small-scale specialisation and high-quality standards as competitive advantages.
But one of Li’s main contentions is that the vulnerable yards are largely to be found in the third of the groups listed above because many of these yards were established speculatively with minimal capital expenditures by people hoping to cash in quickly on the shipbuilding boom.
In many cases, these investors have already decided to cut short their shipbuilding venture and return to their original core businesses. This is not a very painful decision for them as they have on the whole limited their initial investment.
This third group of speculatively developed yards numbers only 20% of the whole or about 80 of 400 emerging yards. But it is here that Li expects most of the yard collapses to occur, rather than among those with more substantial investment and permanent ties to the shipping industries.
ECSs of this third type can often be recognised by a visitor by the absence of a dedicated slipway and an exclusive reliance on a ingenious
Chinese innovation that dates only to about 2005, the airbag launching method ( pictured far right).
To some extent the breakdown between emerging shipyards established by shipping players and emerging shipyards established by outside investors matches up with a geographical distinction between low-lying Jiangsu province, flanking the mouth of the Yangtze river, and hilly Zhejiang province, along the coast just to the south — especially the city of Wenzhou. Li explains that Chinese business culture in Zhejiang has always been marked by the region’s meagre agricultural resources in comparison to the “rice and fish” geography of flat-lying Jiangsu.
This has led to a traditionally opportunistic approach to entering and leaving markets rather than to any great patience with industrial cycles.
He underscores that there are solid shipyards in Zhejiang, including some of those named in Groups 2 and 3 above, and also troubled ones in Jiangsu. But the industry-hopping style of investment is typical of Zhejiang.
“Zhejiang people have to be clever,” said Li. “They are born entrepreneurs. When coal became profitable, they entered the coal trade. When shipbuilding became profitable, the same.”
But Li says the overbuilding crisis in especially the dry-bulk sector is not really the fault of any of the yards but is a simple fact of cyclical history in the shipbuilding industry, which has seen 22 or 23 such overbuilding crises since the 19th century, although this is the largest ever.
The problem is that, unlike in aircraft or car manufacturing, the barriers to entry are not high. You only need proper infrastructure, which can be as simple as a piece of land fronting a river or the sea, a pool of talented and experienced workers, and financing, which was ready at hand before mid-2008.
Chinese provincial policy, rather than central government policy, has had an amplifying effect on the inevitable overbuilding cycle, says Li. Jiangsu, Shandong, Anhui and Hubei provinces all encouraged the quick growth of shipbuilding as a “pillar industry” that would boost GDP.
The effect of the ongoing shakedown, limited mostly to yards in the financially least solid 20%, should be salubrious, Li believes.
“I am still very optimistic about the Chinese shipping industries,” he said. “The inefficient, lower-quality shipyards will be pushed out and we will be on a healthier track.”
He sees perhaps a small amount of consolidation as part of this development, as well-established yards pick up the assets and equipment of less well-positioned ones. But the scope for this is limited.
“There will be some acquisition,” he said. “But right now I think it’s very hard. Even the state-owned groups will not expand.”
A broker and dealmaker at heart, Li sees the best time for placing orders in an ECS as right now. Prices are at a historical low, with handysizes hovering around $20m, down from $35m. The current dearth of orders will also mean that yards will have time to pay attention to all kinds of special requests from owners. Also, many ECSs are financing at a 30:70 ratio, with the 70% coming at delivery, as opposed to the five payments of 20% that was common before the shipbuilding crisis.
04 July 2012, 08:56 GMT
“Life expectancy among 400 yards” 从2005年迄今所成立之400家 “新兴之中国造船厂” 并没有具有危机时帶来之同样期望寿命期………
The approximately 400 yards established in China since 2005, or “emerging Chinese shipyards” (ECSs), do not all have the same story or the same life expectancy and should not all be regarded as in crisis, according to close observer, Mainland Shipping’s Li Sheng. Li gives as an illustration of the difference between solid ECSs and those that are struggling the examples of the Zengzhou and Qifan yards, both in Zhejiang.
Taking an aggressive stance towards the current market instability, Zengzhou bought three 57,000-dwt supramax hulls and one 75,000-dwt panamax at the bankruptcy auction of failed neighbour Blue Sky (Lantian), barged them to its own facility and has been doing the final construction and outfitting there.
Zengzhou is circulating them in the market now, with an asking price of $22m on the supramaxes. Li believes there are some Greek owners interested in the vessels.
In addition to the four leftovers from Lantian, however, Zengzhou is dealing with the lack of new orders by building on speculation for its own account. It is starting with two 64,000-dwt “new supramax” bulkers of a fuel-efficient design.
Before the orphaned Lantian ships, Zengzhou’s track record included three 57,000-dwt supramaxes.
“These shipyards are confident,” said Li. “If they can’t find a buyer, they will operate them on their own account.”
Bigger challenges face the Qifan yard, owned by a Zhejiang province grocery chain tycoon. Two or three years ago, Qifan was crowded with ships under construction, mostly small bulkers.
Li sees this yard as an example of those that jumped into the shipbuilding industry without making a large financial commitment. It rents other yards’ slipways or launches by the airbag method, deferring major capital investment until it has earned income from its first projects.
In Qifan’s case, when the yard started operations in 2003 and 2004, it used truck-mounted mobile cranes, only investing in a gantry crane after it made some money.
“If there had been no financial crisis, yards like this would have made further investments and the supply situation would be even worse,” said Li.
Qifan is now outfitting a 23,000-dwt bulker and finishing four to five 5,000-dwt bulkers. It looks likely to have to operate at least the larger ship for its own account, says Li.
Another struggling yard, but one Li expects to “survive the winter” with some luck, is Xinle.
A few years ago, the yard was so busy with its specialty ships, including 18,500-dwt tankers and 7,000-dwt multipurpose vessels (MPPs), that work was going on everywhere.
“Now it looks like a garden,” said Li. The accompanying photo of Xinle shows how it has tidied up, and Li indicates that this illustrates the yard’s approach to cultivating its reduced workload and managing well.
“I think this shipyard will survive the winter if it finds an order for one or two ships and can build slowly,” said Li. He characterizes Xinle as a “boutique shipyard” and one of a group that should maintain its small scale and its specialisation rather than growing too quickly.
“Many Chinese shipyards may close their doors” 王先生认为如加強造出精良和环保船只,再加上政府对船贷的扶助多家中国造船厂应可渡过难关……… (图 2).
by Mr.Sean Wang, CFO, Rongsheng Heavy Industries.
Those with long memories may well recall the unprecedented misery endured by many of the world’s shipbuilders following a spate of over-ordering and shipyard capacity build-up at the end of the 1970s. Many now fear that the industry faces a similar spell of limited contracting and shipyard consolidation. For the most vulnerable, bankruptcy and closure may have seemed unimaginable two or three years ago, but may now be inevitable.
It is against the backdrop that the world’s largest shipbuilding country-China- is preparing to streamline, rationalize and consolidate its many shipyards, a large number of which have absolutely no work in hand at all. Sean Wang Chief Financial officer of Rongsheng Heavy Industries, believes that many Chinese yards will have to close.
Despite the gloomy outlook for many, however, Wang believes there is a positive outlook for leading yards prepared to embrace new, green technology and willing to adopt what he sees as a vital change in mindset. He says that Chinese shipbuilders must have a new perspective on everything that they do. “Made in China must be a symbol of quality,” he says “We have to build and develop a global brand.”
Chinese yards which plan to see their way through the crisis, Wang suggests, will have to invest heavily on R&D. New and sophisticated ship designs will have to be generated using the latest in green technology matching or even exceeding the quality of ships built elsewhere.
Chinese yards have another powerful card up their sleeve. And that is access to finance. Chinese government has long recognized the value of a domestic shipbuilding industry as an employment provider and as a mean of building up a strong national fleet to carry the country’s booming trade. Chinese banks therefore have been encouraged not only to support shipyards investment directly, but also to focus on finance for foreign owners seeking to build ships there. As world’s traditional ship financiers continue to lick their wounds and shrink their port folios, this could yet prove to be the strongest card in the Chinese hand.
Marine Log June 2012
其他新闻:
1. -德国世界级船贷艮行 Commerz bank finance 和法国 Groupama 保险公司准备退出船贷和船身保险业务. 这对市场将帶来极大的震憾. 前者拥有 260亿美元之船贷
2. -近月来二岸均购进二手客轮准备进军二岸三地之客运. 台塑于4月份买进 “Ocean Pearl” (1970) 22,000g/t并更名为 “Formosa star”. 大新华本月份购入 “Pacific Sun” (1986) 47,700g/t. (图 3)
3. -新加坡航运协会对众多船东提出船只在新加坡所装之燃料油合有白沫什质之说提出辩护.
4. - MOL公司于福建和广东二省设立办事处以提高与货主之合作.
5. -中国六月份矿砂石进口量仝比下降百分之十.
6. -今日之二手海岬型船船价仅是高峰期的五分之一, 如 Swiss Marine公司最近以 1,500万美元购入 “Gaia” (1999) 169,000-dwt.
7. -Kongsberg公司将提供英国 South Tyneside学院一套升级之航海, 机房和航道管理系统模擬器.
8. -欧盟对禁用菲律宾海员一案表决日期巳延到明年, 菲律宾海员因此可松一口气.
9. - Sanko Lines三光公司负债达19亿美元, 在日本和美国申请重组保护一案越演越烈破产恐难逃过.
10. -青岛之 Winning船务公司最近迁往新和坡.
11. -新加坡NOL今年第一季亏损 2.54亿美元, 而欲出售价达 3.14亿美元之公司大楼.
12. -OOCL公司今年上半年运作 134万箱位同比上升 6.7%,营业额同比上升 10.6%.
13. -台塑把二条新 VLCC以每天 27500美元租金租给韩国现代船务公司, 专家分析这是一宗亏本交易.
-中国五月份原油进口平均为每天 939万桶. 14.
二：造船 (Shipbuilding)
1. -世界船东协会和国际船务公会在Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 组织于巴黎开 Shipbuilding working party 6 (WP6) 会时呼吁政府不要支持造船厂以减少船只过剩帶来之负面影响.
2. -虽然货运市场欠佳但 MOL仍然继续船队更新方案(Capesize船龄保持在 15年之下) 订造 10 20万吨环保和浅吃水之干散船.
3. -台湾长荣公司推翻不加盟超大型货箱船行列政策,准备向希腊 Enesel 公司由2013年开始租用 10条超大型 13,800-teu集装箱船, 租期5年租金为每天5万美元. 业者分析该公司另一批向三星造船厂所订造于2015年交船之 20条8,000-teu新船去向如何尚难预测.
4. -韩进造船厂 (Hanjin) 于菲律宾苏必湾分厂因订单减少而欲替该集团船公司造船以便维持局面,但业者认为贷款有问题.
三：港口 (Terminal)
1. -美西Longview 港本月9日迎来一座新的小麦码头(grain terminal), 此码头是美国本土25年来第一个新造装之小麦码头,它是由Bunge, Itochu和 STX PanOcean 三家公司合作投资 2亿美元所造, 每年可装 150-200条船到亚洲.
四：海难 (Casualty)
1. -“MSC Flaminia” (2001) 6,732-teu本月14日于大西洋因货箱爆炸引起火灾.25名船员乘救生艇弃船时一名船员死亡三名受伤. 船员籍贯为俄罗斯, 烏克兰和菲律宾.因出事位置于正常欧美航道上, 已有6条货得传后驰往救援.(图4)
五：买卖/租贷 (S/P & Chartering)
1. S & P
-“Baosteel Education” (2009) 228527-dwt, Bulker usd 45.00M, Japan
-New building re-sale (2012) 176000-dwt, Bulker usd 38.00M, Greek
-“Cape Wisteria” (1997) 171846-dwt, Bulker usd 15.00M. Japan
-“Stella Maris” (2007) 52454-dwt, Bulker usd 18.00M, unknown
-“Cordelia” (1986) 40763-dwt, Bulker usd 3.10M, China
-“La Esperanza” (1993) 299700-dwt, Tanker usd 22.00M, unknown
-“Champion Power” (1999) 105083-dwt, Tanker usd 11.70M, Bakri
-“Kirsten” (1988) 83660-dwt, Tanker usd 8.00M, Dubai
2. DEMO
-“Shagang Sunrise” (1997) 172904-dwt usd 355/ldt, China
-“Stella Fortune” (1995) 151283-dwt usd 355/ldt, China
-“BIC Irini” (1993) 103203-dwt usd 425/ldt,Bangladesh
-“VSP Diamond” (1984) 63800-dwt usd 360/ldt, China
-“B. India” (1983) 41427-dwt usd 383/ldt, Bangladesh
-“Unity” (1994) 96173-dwt usd 388/ldt, Bangladesh
-“Lion” (1989) 46538-dwt usd 410/ldt, Pakistan
-“Heng Shun Xing” (1983) 32454-dwt usd 360/ldt,Bangladesh
3. 本星期远东 2002年造二手船平均价值:
种类 油轮 干散货轮 集装箱轮 (teu)_
船型 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Cape Pmax Supramax Handy Pmax Handy Fmax
吨位(万) 31 16 11 18 7..5 5 3 4000 1400 750
升降(百分比) 0% -0.7% 0% -0.6% +1.2% +2.6% +0.8% -0.9% -2.7% -1.0%
4. Daily Summary of Baltic Exchange Dry Indices 2012.07.16
Baltic Exchange Dry Index BDI 1102 (- 8)
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index BCI 1310 (- 10)
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index BPI 1209 (+ 7)
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index BSI 1277 (- 10)
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index BHSI 687 (- 5)
5. TIMECHARTER
-“Alpha Era” (2000) 170387 dwt dely retro Dangjin 21/6 trip via Brazil redel S’pore-Jpn range $7800 daily – Cargill
-“King Harold” (2011) 79642 dwt dely Haldia 04/06 July trip via EC S.Am redel S’pore-Jpn range $10500 daily – Louis Dreyfus
-“Federica Prima” (2005) 76662 dwt dely EC S.Am 20/30 July trip via Brazil redel China, Int.grain daily $15250+$52500bb- Beibu Gulf
-“Da Ying” (2003) 75318 dwt dely Ningbo Spot trip via EC S.Am redel S’pore-Jpn range $6750 daily – Beibu
-“Vinalines Trader” (1997) 69614 dwt dely psg Taichung 08/13 July trip via Samarinda redel India $5500 daily – Samsun Logix
-“Sea Lord” (1995) 69128 dwt dely Beilun Spot trip via China redel EC India, int.ferts $6000 daily – cnr
-“JOSCO Changzhou” (2011) 58764 dwt dely Xiamen Spot trip via SE Asia redel China, int.Nickel ore, $11500 daily – cnr
-“Rhodos” (2011) 57306 dwt dely Hongkong early July trip via Indonesia redel EC India $8000 daily – Oldendorff
-“Riva Wind” (2005) 53533 dwt dely Xingang Spot trip via Phillippines redel China, int.Nickel ore, $7500 daily – Tongli
6. PERIOD
-“Great Song” (2011) 180388-dwt 12-16 months usd 10750/daily Swiss Marine
-“Dansa Shark” (2012) 179500-dwt 5-8 months usd 10000/daily Classic Maritime
-“Fortune Iris” (2009) 82372-dwt 4-6 months usd 8600/daily Panacore
-“Tyana” (2010) 82158-dwt 4-6 months usd 9500/daily Bunge
-“Xiao Yu” (2011) 76116-dwt 3-5 months usd 8600/daily D’Amico
7. ORE
-Tbn 160000/10%, Port Hedland/青島 13/16 July usd 6.80 fio, sc/30000sc -- FMG
-Tbn 160000/10%, Port Hedland/青島 10/15 July usd 6.70 fio, sc/30000sc -- PMI
-“Bao Zhou Hai” (2004) 160000/10%, Dampier/青島 28/7- 01/8 usd 7.90 fio. sc/30000sc -- Rio Tinto
-“Hou Heng 2” (2011) 160000/10%, Tubarao/青島 25/31 July usd 18.75 fio. sc/30000sc -- Vale
-“Sivota” (2008) 160000/10%, Itaguai/青島 20/30 July usd 17.50 fio, sc/30000sc -- Louis Dreyfus
8. COAL
-Tbn 130000/10%, Taboneo/SKorea 08/19 July usd 4.55 fio, 15000shinc/25000shinc -- KEPCO
-“Ikan Kedewas” (2006) 75000/10%, Taboneo/New Mangalore 05/15 July usd 7.20 fio, 15000shinc/25000shinc -- Cetragpa
六：2012/07/16 船用燃油价格(每吨/usd)
来源: Bunkerworld
IFO 380 __IFO 180 MDO MGO
新加坡 602 615 860 865
鹿特丹 585 608 ----- 875
休士顿 590 630 ----- 910
*****************************************************************************************************
备注: tbn = to be named ldt = light d/weight ton
usd = u.s.dollar mtpa = million ton per annum
cbm =cubic meter tpa =million metric ton per annu
